(section II). On this new account, the legitimacy of expectations depends not on whether these expectations are based on laws or legal entitlements nor on the substantive justice of the expectations nor on the justice of the basic structure that forms the background to these expectations nor on the legitimate authority of the governmental administrative agents or agencies whose actions or omissions are the subject of these expectations. On the Responsibility-Based Account, the legitimacy of 6 I borrow the distinction between predictive and prescriptive expectations from M. L. Houser, "Are we violating their expectations? Instructor communication expectations of traditional and nontraditional students," Communication Quarterly, 53 (2005) , 213-28. 7 For an overview, see Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, "Individual expectations and climate justice," Analyse & Kritik, 33 (2011) , 449-71; Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, "How legitimate expectations matter in climate justice," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 13 (2014) , 369-93. expectations (section IV). I also make some tentative suggestions about what sort of more abstract or general normative standard this principle might be derived from.
Finally, I offer some brief clarifications of my position on the relationship between legitimate expectations, justice, and legitimate authority (section V).
I. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
I shall begin by outlining three existing accounts of legitimate expectations. The first is the Law-Based Account. According to this account, talk of legitimate expectations is shorthand for the sort of beliefs or predictions about the future, as well as the sort of prescriptive claims about the future, that are based on a system of law and legal entitlements, as opposed to merely social customs, habits, or conventions (pre-legal).
In other words, the term "legitimate" functions to flag up the fact that an expectation the scales of utility, Bentham assigns extra weight to minimising the pain of disappointment. 16 Indeed, in a number of his writings relating to property Bentham defends what he variously dubs "the disappointment-preventive principle," "the nondisappointment principle," or "the disappointment-minimizing principle"-a principle which calls on those responsible for creating new, or making changes to existing, laws and legal institutions to minimise the disappointment of individuals' expectations, including individuals' expectations of certain items of property that are based on their already being in possession of those items and the underlying social custom (pre-legal or only partially legalised) of respecting the fact that individuals are in possession of certain items of property by not attempting to seize those items from them.
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So when confronted with the Law-Based Account one wonders why expectations are only legitimate if they are based on a system of law or set of formalised and coercively enforced public rules. Could not they also be legitimate if they are based on social customs or a set of informal public habits or conventions? Could not the fact that an individual's prescriptive expectation of keeping x is based on a social custom (pre-legal) that individuals in possession of x get to keep x also make the relevant expectation warranted in one sense?
Of course, if one recognises as legitimate, expectations based on social customs, along with expectations based on laws, then one is also opening up the possibility of conflicts between the different kinds of expectations. Perhaps defenders of the LawBased Account would argue that in such instances the expectations based on law would always trump those based on social customs, and this reveals something about the nature of true legitimacy. But then there may be instances when it is a good thing to uphold expectations based on customs over expectations based on law-such as if there has been a customary practice not to try to remove people living on disused, derelict, or unused land, and individuals have relied on their customary expectations 16 Ibid. Bentham also provides some concrete illustrations of how courts should decide cases involving customary expectations in accordance with the disappointment-preventive principle. Ibid., . 17 medical treatment for conditions that the relevant authorities were within their rights to refuse to fund on the basis of a policy of not funding cosmetic conditions. 37 )
In the next section I present and defend a rival account; or, at least, a rival account of legitimate expectations for public administration.
II. A NEW RESPONSIBILITY-BASED ACCOUNT
The previous accounts locate the legitimacy of expectations in the presence of laws which ground expectations (the Law-Based Account), in the substantive justice of expectations or in the justice of the basic structure which forms the background to expectations (the Justice-Based Account), or in the legitimacy of the governing agencies and political authorities whose acts and omissions are the subject of expectations (the Legitimate Authority-Based Account). By contrast, my proposed new account, the Responsibility-Based Account, focuses on the normatively salient issue of whether or not governmental administrative agencies are were responsible for creating the expectations after they had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion over the relevant policies and measures.
The Law-Based Account, Justice-Based Account, and Legitimate AuthorityBased Account each offer necessary and sufficient conditions under which expectations are legitimate. Provided that agents possess expectations and these expectations are based on laws, exist against the background of a just basic structure, or concern the legitimate actions of legitimate governing agencies and political authorities, then this is sufficient to render these expectations legitimate. On these other accounts, then, it is not crucial per se that governmental administrative agents or agencies are responsible for creating expectations. So, even if it turned out that such an agent or agency was not really responsible for creating the relevant expectations, those expectations would nevertheless be legitimate provided that the aforementioned necessary conditions were met.
On my proposed account, by contrast, the responsibility of governmental administrative agents or agencies for creating expectations does matter, and it matters decisively. In other words, expectations about what governmental administrative agents or agencies will do or not do in the future are legitimate if, and only if, those agents or agencies were responsible for creating the expectations after they had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion over the relevant policies and measures. If these conditions are met, then the expectations are legitimate even if they are not based on laws, are not substantively just or do not exist against the background of a just basic structure, and are not based on or do not concern the legitimate (intra vires) actions of legitimate governing agencies and political authorities.
Interestingly, defenders of existing accounts of the legitimacy of expectations have at times hinted that they might also endorse the Responsibility-Based Account.
In Nevertheless, the different ways are intended to be merely illustrative, rather than exhaustive, of how governmental agencies of government can be responsible for creating expectations on the part of non-governmental agents. Conceivably there may be other ways that also fall under the rubric of responsibility.
(1) Expectations which are inadvertently caused by governmental administrative agents or agencies.
(i) Governmental administrative agent or agency G has been given or has assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making decisions over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental agent A, something of which both G and A are fully aware.
(ii) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x is a procedural action/omission) by virtue of G inadvertently causing A to believe or predict that G will x.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has inadvertently caused A to believe or predict that G will x could be due simply to: (a) G in the past permitting A to receive some advantage, benefit, or other outcome.
In virtue of (i) and (ii)(a), G has thereby also created a legitimate expectation on the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive sense, G to x, and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x.
(2) Expectations which are negligently caused by governmental administrative agents or agencies.
(i) Governmental administrative agent or agency G has been given or has assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making decisions 44 Traditionally administrative courts in England have applied the doctrine of legitimate expectations, first, to circumstances in which an expectation (procedural or substantive) is based upon past provision of an advantage or benefit, and second, to circumstances in which an expectation (procedural or substantive) is based upon an assurance or promise.
over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental agent A, something of which both G and A are fully aware.
(iii) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x could be a procedural or a substantive action/omission) in virtue of G negligently causing A to believe or predict that G will x.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has negligently caused A to believe or predict that G will x could be due to: (b) G in the past permitting A to receive some advantage, benefit, or other outcome, and by G knowing that this past practice is set to change, but nevertheless failing to take reasonable steps to warn A personally, and in a timely fashion, that this past practice is set to change, or G failing to take reasonable steps to warn A that its past practice is an unreliable guide to what it will do or not do in the future; or (c) G doing the same as described in (b) plus relying on third parties to warn A of the aforementioned, but not doing enough to reinforce those warnings itself, such as by signposting, confirming, or reiterating the advice given by third parties.
In virtue of (i) and (iii)(b)/(c), G has thereby also created a legitimate expectation on the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive sense, G to x, and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x.
(3) Expectations which are intentionally caused by governmental administrative agents or agencies.
(iv) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x could be a procedural or a substantive action/omission) by virtue of G intentionally causing A to believe or predict that G will x.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has intentionally caused A to believe or predict that G will x could be due to:
there is a public interest that G will x or making it known that a state of affairs which is normally sufficient for G to x obtains, with the intention of causing A to believe or predict that G will x; (e) G requiring A to make a declaration that G knows is thereby likely to make A believe G will x, with the intention of causing A to believe or predict that G will x; (f) G providing A with an assurance that G is minded to x, with the intention of causing A to believe or predict that G will x; or (g) G providing A with a commitment, undertaking, or promise that G will x, with the intention of causing A to believe or predict that G will x.
In virtue of (i) and (iv)(d)/(e)/(f)/(g), G has thereby also created a legitimate expectation on the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive sense, G to x, and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x.
I need to make three things clear about these modes of creating legitimate expectations. The first is that, as a whole, (1)- (3) do not assume some background theory of promissory obligations and rights or theory of contractual obligations and rights; which is to say, I am not suggesting that any moral obligations and rights arising from the creation of legitimate expectations are species of promissory obligations and rights or species of contractual obligations and rights, concerning which I owe some background theory. 45 On the contrary, I take it that legitimate expectations, and any moral obligations and rights as well as any legal effects or relief to which they give rise, are sui generis.
Although mode (3)(iv)(g) does involve G providing A with a commitment, undertaking, or promise that G will x, the legitimate expectation created is more than, and is not reducible to, a mere promissory right alone. It also includes (i) and (iv), as well as the fact that A expects G to x, in the prescriptive sense, and the fact that A's expectation is justifiable. Moreover, it should be noted that (3)(iv)(g) does not necessarily involve the sort of "joint commitment" that some theorists identify with promissory obligations.
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Likewise, it is entirely feasible that none of the modes of creating legitimate expectations (1)-(3) rise to the level of making a contract, meaning that it is quite possible that in none of these modes is it the case that G has made a contract with A, or even an implied contract. Even if one thinks that all contracts involve promises, 47 it
does not follow that all promises are contracts. On the contrary, a contract must contain mutual promises, promises travelling in both directions. Notice that in mode (3)(iv)(g) the promise is only in one direction. Now in response it might be suggested that in real life examples of legitimate expectations, there are implied promises on the part of the agent. Thus, suppose agent A is involved in delivering services to the public and that when a governmental administrative agency G causes agent A to believe or predict that G will x (e.g., grant funding to A) by providing agent A with a written or verbal commitment, undertaking, or promise that G will x, G does so not in a vacuum but partly on the basis that A has also made a promise to use the money for the intended purposes, to act lawfully, to deliver value for money, to achieve adequate quality levels, to maintain appropriate governance, and so forth. In this event there is a reciprocal promise and, therefore, we could be in the terrain of an implied contract.
However, although I am not denying that some instances of legitimate expectations can also be instances of reciprocal promises and implied contracts, what I am suggesting is that it is quite possible for governmental administrative agents or agencies to create legitimate expectations even in the absence of reciprocal promises and implied contracts. So I think we can also imagine a situation in which governmental administrative agent or agency G causes agent A to believe or predict that G will x by promising A that G will x in the absence of A making any reciprocal promise, and in the absence of making an implied contract. or predictions outlined in (1)-(3) can be simple beliefs that G will x, but they can also be more complicated probabilistic predictions that G will x, signifying that A predicts that G will x with n degree of probability. Either way, they are expectations about the future.
Moreover, the relevant expectations are also prescriptive: they involve not merely A believing or predicting that G will x, but also A holding that G should x. In addition, each of these three modes involves prescriptive expectations that are not baseless but are instead justifiable, in the sense that there is some epistemic justification or warrant
for A expecting that G should x. This justification is based on agent A's sound or credible belief that G was in some way responsible for bringing about A's expectation.
Together these descriptions and conditions play a crucial role in ensuring that (1)- (3) are in fact modes of creating legitimate expectations as opposed to ways of creating states of affair that are legitimate but not expectations, or states of affair that are expectations but not legitimate.
The third thing I need to make clear is that I use the phrase "in virtue of" in order to underscore the fact that the grounds or bases for saying that legitimate expectations have been created are contained in the preceding descriptions and conditions. In other words, what is supposed to explain why it is justifiable, or what is supposed to make it justifiable, for A to expect G to x, in the prescriptive sense, is specified in the descriptions of what is at stake, in what is believed or predicted, and in the contents of the conditions (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) that come before the phrase "in virtue of."
But what is it about the various descriptions and conditions set out in modes (1)-(3) that render it justifiable for A to expect G to x in the prescriptive sense? What do they have common? I believe that one of the crucial elements here is the conduct of G or, to be more precise, G's responsibility for bringing about A's belief or prediction. I
shall say more about the nature of this responsibility (and why it is not question begging) in section III. For now I simply want to make the claim that A's epistemic justification or warrant for holding or affirming that G should x is partly A's sound or credible belief that G was responsible for bringing about A's belief or prediction that G will x. Putting this another way, if a governmental administrative agent or agency G is responsible, or can be credited (if that is the right word), for producing A's beliefs or predictions that G will x, then it is more justifiable for A to hold that G should x than would otherwise be the case. In short, if G tried to claim that A has no basis on which to affirm that G should x, A can reasonably say to G the following, "Since you led me to expect that you would x, you now really ought to x."
However, I believe that a second shared element is necessary to make agents' expectations truly justifiable: namely, the fact that governmental administrative agents or agencies had already either been given or assumed, in the sense of taking upon themselves, a role responsibility, competence, or discretion (administrative courts aside) for making binding decisions about issues that impinge on the interests of nongovernmental agents-decisions which are the subject matter of those agents'
expectations. Irrespective of whether or not governmental administrative agencies actually have legitimate authority on their side or are acting with legitimate authority, the brute fact that they have taken on this role responsibility means that nongovernmental agents have no real option but to rely on the conduct of governmental agencies qua decision-makers. Suppose agent A-a school-is forming a belief or prediction about public funding for a rebuilding project it aims to undertake, and a government agency G directly induces the expectation that funding will be forthcoming. It matters crucially, as far as the legitimacy of A's expectation is concerned, that G has also taken on the role of primary decision-maker on public funding for school rebuilding projects like A's. In short, A will need to take its lead about what to expect in terms of public funding from the indications and representations made by G.
On the proposed account, therefore, the relevant form of responsibility is twofold: first, being a governmental administrative agent or agency which has already been given or has assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making binding decisions about what will or will not happen in matters affecting nongovernment agents' important interests; second, being a governmental administrative agent or agency which has been responsible for creating expectations on the part nongovernment agents. The idealised conditions set out in modes (1)- (3) concluded that by failing to act for a year to warn Mrs C that she was acting in contravention of the policy, both Mrs C and Mr E had a legitimate expectation that Mr E was being employed as a carer for Mr D. 52 On the Responsibility-Based Account, the decision of the Ombudsman could be justified on the basis of finding that the Council had negligently caused the expectation by not having taken reasonable steps to warn Mrs C and Mr E that they were in contravention of the policy and could not reliably assume that they would be treated as an exception case, as per mode (2).
III. A COMPLEX THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY
The theory of responsibility underpinning the Responsibility-Based Account is complex in the following ways. One aspect of responsibility pertains to whether or not a governmental administrative agent or agency has already been given or assumed, in the sense of taking upon itself, a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making binding decisions over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental agents. Of course, in one sense no governmental administrative agent or agency can be given or assume the mantle of making final decisions so long as their decisions are reviewable by administrative courts. But setting the rule of law 51 No. 13 011 545 (LGO England, 18 January 2016). 52 Ibid., at [26] .
aside, the issue is whether the governmental administrative agent or agency has been given or simply adopted the posture of principal decision-maker with the power to make those decisions binding. If so, then the conduct of that agency in terms of
creating expectations about what it will do or not do takes on a greater significance.
By making this claim I am not appealing to the Legitimate Authority-Based Account. That a governmental administrative agency has been given or assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making binding decisions about issues that impinge on the important interests of non-governmental agents is separate from the issue of its doing so with or without legitimate authority. This separate issue concerns not only whether or not a governmental administrative agent or agency has acted or would be acting, on a particular occasion, intra vires (within its legal authority) or ultra vires (outside its legal authority), 53 but also whether or not it, and the system of law and government of which it is a part, in general exhibits legitimate political authority (a justified right to rule). 54 Even though "legitimate expectations"
is a compound noun, in fact the semantics of this term are non-compositional. In other words, one does not come to properly understand what the term means simply by adding together the ordinary meanings of the terms "legitimate" and "expectations" as they occur in other areas of legal and political thought.
In a modern state, more often than not, it will be a governmental administrative agent or agency that is given or assumes a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making binding administrative decisions about the provision of public services, goods, and benefits. But where another body, such as a private organisation, does have something akin to this responsibility, then potentially it could also be appropriate to speak of legitimate expectations. Then again, such an appeal to legitimate expectations might be unnecessary or redundant if there are other legal doctrines that can be utilised by aggrieved agents, such as the doctrine of promissory estoppel in private law.
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A second aspect of responsibility concerns the connection between the conduct of the governmental administrative agent or agency and the occurrence of the nongovernmental agent's belief or prediction about what the former will do or not do.
Here responsibility can be grounded in different ways. For one thing, responsibility might be based primarily in simple causation, including causation by omission, causation by action, and causation by a combination of omission and action. Under mode (1), for example, G might inadvertently cause A to believe or predict that G will institute a fair procedure prior to changing its policy simply by G permitting A to enjoy that policy for an extended period of time. A need only prove that A has the expectation and that G was responsible for the expectation in the sense that G caused it, even if G did not act negligently or with intention. Of course, even if it is not necessary to prove that G failed to take reasonable steps to disabuse A of the expectation or to prove that G intended to cause the expectation, it still might be necessary to show that G was conscious or aware that by permitting A to receive some advantage, benefit, or other outcome it was bringing about A's expectation. So in that sense this responsibility might be primarily based on causation, but also includes some element of G being conscious or aware of doing the actions which caused the expectation, albeit inadvertently. Note that mode (1), unlike modes (2) and (3), only covers procedural expectations. This is because the brute fact of past practice is insufficient by itself to make a governmental administrative agency truly responsible for an agent coming to harbour a substantive expectation, in the absence of other conduct on the part of the agency that might justify such an attribution.
Responsibility can also be grounded on negligence or intention depending on the circumstances of the case. Under mode (2), G might negligently cause A to believe or predict that G will provide some advantage, benefit, or other outcome by G in the past permitting A to enjoy that outcome, and by G's failure to take reasonable steps to try to prevent A from forming this expectation, despite G knowing its unreliability.
Negligence is reflected in the fact that as an administrative agency of government G has a duty of concern to agents to take reasonable steps to prevent them from harbouring unreliable expectations about what it will do or not do in the future, under 55 For a discussion of the differences between the legal doctrines of legitimate expectations and estoppel, see Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality, circumstances when G knows that A's expectation is unreliable (because G knows what is on the cards).
This duty of concern might well be idiosyncratic to government. Ordinarily we cannot hold individual citizens, businesses, or non-governmental organisations responsible for causing expectations by omission. If they change their courses of action in ways that frustrate our expectations-because we expected them to behave in the future as they have done in the past-we cannot reasonably blame them for not warning us in advance that their behaviour is subject to change. But administrative agencies of government are not the same in that regard: they do have a duty of concern not to let us form expectations of future courses of action without taking reasonable steps to prevent us from forming what they know to be unreliable expectations. Thus, the substantive issue that will need to be decided by courts given the facts of particular cases is whether or not the governmental administrative agency has done enough to prevent agents from developing unreliable expectations, such as by issuing sufficient warnings.
Turning to mode (3), here responsibility is partly based on causation by actions, but also based on intention, reflected in the fact that G has intentionally set out to cause A to form a belief or prediction that G will x. Therefore, one substantive issue that will need to be addressed by courts given the facts of particular cases is whether or not the governmental administrative agency had indeed intended to cause the agent to believe or predict that the agency would x. Education on the matter of government policy regarding the assisted places scheme exhibited "mistake" and "incompetence" as opposed to revealing any "intention" to flag up a new policy whereby a certain category of children would keep their funded places beyond primary school age. 57 In light of these sorts of judgements, it is surely not too far a stretch to ask courts, therefore, to enquire as to whether a governmental administrative agency had intended to cause the agent to believe or predict that the agency would x. virtue of the responsibility of the governmental administrative agent or agency in bringing about the relevant belief or prediction. Of course, governmental administrative agencies will often create and will sometimes frustrate legitimate expectations for the sake of other areas of justice, such as in the arrangement of economic inequalities, justice in the conditions of access to jobs, housing, transport, and services, and justice in the provision of basic liberties. But I see no reason to suppose that the legitimacy of these expectations must themselves supervene on or be determined by justice in these other areas of justice.
However, by saying that justice in other areas does not determine the legitimacy of expectations I do not mean to imply that legitimate expectations do not raise issues of justice. On the contrary, I believe that the ways in which governmental administrative agencies handle legitimate expectations is in fact constitutive of one form of justice. Rawls has provided an account of the justice (under ideal conditions) presupposed by legitimate expectations. I am seeking to provide an account of justice in how governmental agencies handle the creation and then potential frustration of legitimate expectations (under non-ideal conditions). We may call this form of justice administrative justice to help distinguish it from social or distributive justice.
In terms of legitimate authority, I would argue that even an expectation that is frustrated by a legitimate authority may retain a residue of legitimacy in virtue of the responsibility of the governmental administrative agent or agency in bringing about the relevant belief or prediction. Furthermore, I do not think that in order for an expectation to be legitimate at t2 it must be the case that the expectation was created by an agency acting intra vires and based on legitimate political authority at t1. Even if a governmental administrative agent or agency was acting ultra vires and/or lacked legitimate political authority at the time of creating the expectation at t1 or would be acting illegitimately in honouring the expectation at t2, the expectation can still be legitimate at t2 based on the responsibility of that agency for creating it. 
